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Abstract
In a multi-protocol setting, di￿erent protocols are concurrently executed, and each principal can participate
in more than one. The possibilities of attacks therefore increase, often due to the presence of similar
patterns in messages. Messages coming from one protocol can be confused with similar messages coming
from another protocol. As a consequence, data of one type may therefore be interpreted as data of another,
and it is also possible that the type is the expected one, but the message is addressed to another protocol.
In this paper, we shall present an extension of the LySa calculus [ 6,4] that decorates encryption with tags
including the protocol identi￿er, the protocol step identi￿er and the intended types of the encrypted terms.
The additional information allows us to ￿nd which are the messages that can be confused and therefore
to have hints to reconstruct the attack. We extend accordingly the standard static Control Flow Analysis
for LySa, which over-approximates all the possible behaviour of the studied protocols and, in particular,
in order to capture the message confusions that may occur at run-time. In the same unifying framework
for studying protocols, o￿ered by the suitably annotated Lysa and its Control Flow Analysis, a wide range
of security properties can be dealt with, including con￿dentiality, freshness and message authentication.
Our analysis has been implemented and successfully applied to small sets of protocols. In particular, we
discovered a new and undocumented family of attacks, that may arise when Bauer-Berson-Feiertag and the
Woo-Lam authentication protocols are running in parallel. The implementation complexity of the analysis
is low polynomial.
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1 Introduction
Usually, security protocols are studied and veri￿ed in isolation, i.e. under the hy-
pothesis that there is only a single protocol using the network at a time. Unfortu-
nately, this is not realistic, since protocols share the same network and often they
also share some cryptographic keys, for economical or practical reasons. Veri￿ca-
tion of properties is more di￿cult in this setting, because of possible unintended and
unforeseen interactions: new attacks, involving more than one protocol, can arise,
called multi-protocol attacks. For this reason, protocols that are proved secure in
1 This work has been partially supported by the project SENSORIA.isolation, can be attack-prone when running in parallel: indeed, security properties
are not compositional in general. The ￿rst work on this subject are in [ 2,18], where
the authors show that given a secure protocol, an ad hoc protocol can be used to
attack it, by suitably interleaving messages of both. Formal veri￿cation in this set-
ting is still considered as an open problem [22] to which we intend to contribute. In
the multi-protocol setting, one of the main problems is the presence of similar pat-
terns in messages coming from di￿erent protocols. As a consequence, attacks may
easily occur, due to the confusion between two messages that belong to di￿erent
protocols. Mainly, these attacks are based on type ￿aws, that occur when a ￿eld,
originally intended to have one type, is instead interpreted as having another type.
To prevent such attacks, the current techniques [ 16,17] consist in systematically
associating each message ￿eld with a tag representing its intended type. Therefore
￿elds with di￿erent types cannot be mixed up. Other attacks may arise instead,
that depend on the mix-up of two messages with the same structure but that belong
to di￿erent protocols. Therefore, in general, type tags may not su￿ce. Following
[7] and extending the work done in [5], we then annotate each message with an
identi￿er for the protocol, and the protocol step, and with the type of each message
component. Here, we only deal with message confusions arising from messages that
include the same number of terms, i.e. in the present framework it is not possible
to confuse e.g. a concatenation of terms with a single term.
In this paper, we explore these issues and propose a static analysis technique,
based on Control Flow Analysis, for detecting potential type ￿aw attacks in the
presence of a Dolev-Yao attacker [11]. To this end, we extend the version of LySa
calculus presented in [4] with special tags, that, besides the intended types of the
encrypted terms, also include the protocol identi￿er and the protocol step identi-
￿er. This additional information can also be exploited to understand which are
the possible message confusions and interferences between di￿erent protocols. The
Control Flow Analysis approximates the behaviour of protocols in terms of the pos-
sibly exchanged messages and potential values of variables. Our framework can be
working in either a prescriptive way, such that ￿aws are avoided; or a descriptive
way, such that ￿aws are detected and recorded as violations. Furthermore, if no
tag violation is found, we can prove that the protocol is free of type ￿aw attacks at
run time. The analysis is fully automated and always terminates. By applying this
framework to the multi-protocol setting, we can statically verify if in a small group
of protocols tag-violations and the consequent attacks are possible. In particular,
we discovered a family of new and undocumented ￿aws (to our knowledge), pos-
sibly occurring when the Bauer-Berson-Feiertag and the Woo-Lam authentication
protocols are running in parallel.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present the LySa calculus
with tags. We introduce the Control Flow Analysis in Section 3, which captures any
tag-mismatching that may happen. In Section 4, we show how the Control Flow
Analysis can detect an attack that may arise in the composition of two protocols.
In Section 5, we conclude with a discussion on our approach.
22 Calculus
The LySa calculus [6] is a process algebra, in the tradition of the ￿- [23] and Spi- [1]
calculi. It di￿ers from these essentially in two aspects. The ￿rst is the absence of
channels: all processes have only access to a single global communication channel,
the ether. The second aspect concerns the inclusion of pattern matching within
those language constructs where values can become binding to values, i.e. into input
and into decryption. This di￿ers from a separate matching construct (usually an if-
then construct) as in other process calculi and leads to more succinct speci￿cations
of protocols. We use here a dialect of LySa, which presents a more general pattern
matching than the one in [6] and that slightly extend the one in [4], thus allowing us
to tag encryptions and their components. In this paper, we only show the modelling
of symmetric key protocols. Asymmetric key protocols can be dealt with in a very
similar way.
Syntax of Terms
LySa consists of terms and processes; values correspond to closed terms,
i.e. terms without free variables. Values are then the basic blocks of the calculus
and are used to represent agent names, nonces, keys. Terms may either be terms
E or de￿nition terms M. In fact, we distinguish between de￿nition (or binding)
occurrences and use (or applied) occurrences of variables. A de￿nition occurrence
is when a variable gets its binding value, while a use occurrence is an appearance
of a variable where its binding value is used. So far, we have that terms { that can
be names or variables { are used for modelling outputs and encryptions. Instead,
for modelling inputs and decryptions we use de￿nition terms, that, in turn, can be
terms, or de￿nition variables.
The use/de￿nition distinction is obtained by means of syntax: the de￿nition
occurrence of a variable x is denoted by \x, while in the scope of the declaration,
the variable appears as x. This notation allows us to distinguish variables from
occurrences of terms in tuples of de￿nition terms, by implicitly partitioning them
into terms or variables. In pattern matching, the ￿rst are checked for matching,
while the others are bound in case of successful matching (see below).
We have two syntactic categories, one for terms E and one for de￿nition terms
M. Encryptions are tuples of terms (de￿nition terms) E1;￿￿￿;Ek (M1;￿￿￿;Mk,
resp.) encrypted under a term E0 representing a shared key.
E ::= terms
n name (n 2 N)
x use variable (x 2 XS)
fE1;￿￿￿;EkgE0 symmetric encryption
M ::= de￿nition terms
E terms
\x de￿nition variable (x 2 XS)
fM1;:::;MkgE0 de￿nition encryption
Here N denotes a set of names; the set XS contains occurrences of variables, be
they use or de￿nition, respectively.
Tagging On the top of this syntax, in [4], an extension was proposed, in order
to cope with types, where tags were introduced to represent the intended types of
3terms. The following formal treatment (syntax, semantics and control ￿ow analysis)
is very similar to the one adopted in [4]. Following [16], we indeed assumed to have
a tag for each base type, such as nonce, key, etc. Moreover, we assume that the
attacker is able to change tags, but only those of terms that he can access. In fact,
by making the assumption of perfect cryptography, we have that only cleartext can
be altered. Attackers can thus only forge an encryption when possessing the key
used to cipher it. Actually, we can tag every term we want, but it su￿ces to check
this information inside encryptions and decryptions, as shall be shown in Section 3.
Here, we further extend the above syntax in order to include in the tagging schema
of encryptions, an identi￿er ID for the protocol, and an identi￿er for the message
step i, in which the encryption is generated. Tags Tag range over a given set
Tag and therefore contain, besides type tags, such as agent, nonce, key, and enc,
also a string IDi encoding the protocol identi￿er and the message step identi￿er.
Furthermore, there are tag variables, that are to standard variables such as tags
are to closed terms (i.e. terms without variables). Similarly to the \-notation, we
syntactically distinguish the de￿nition occurrences of tag variables (in the form ]t),
from the corresponding use occurrences (in the form t). Syntactically, we enrich
the previous categories with the following productions, where XT denote sets of
occurrences of tag variables:
E ::= terms
:::
Tag tags (Tag 2 Tag)
t use tag variable (t 2 XT )
M ::= de￿nition terms
:::
]t de￿nition tag variable (t 2 XT )
Intuitively, when specifying a protocol, we substitute each encryption like
fE1;:::;EkgE0 with the tagged form fIDi;(E1;Tag1)￿￿￿;(Ek;Tagk)gE0. We call
V al the set of values, i.e. closed terms. Each term can have a tag associated with
it. We do not associate each term with the corresponding tag, though. We just use
tags, when necessary. Put in other words, it is like having a jolly tag associated
with each other term, that is omitted, because its checking is always successful.
Syntax of Processes
In addition to the classical constructs for composing processes, our calculus also
contains both an input construct with matching and a decryption operation with
matching. Furthermore, to allow the static analysis to keep track of the decryptions
in which a violation may occur, we decorate each decryption with a label l (from an
enumerable set C). Labels are mechanically attached to program points in which
decryptions occur (actually, they are speci￿c nodes in the abstract syntax tree of
processes), so the user/attacker cannot manipulate them. Finally, by overloading
the symbol ￿, we use a new process construct to declare the expected tag of a tag
4variable.
P ::= hE1;:::;Eki:P j (M1;:::;Mk):P j decrypt E as fM1;:::;Mkgl
E0 in P j
(￿ n)P j (￿ ]t : Tag)P j P1jP2 j !P j 0
We use fv(￿) for representing the sets of free variables and tag variables, fn(￿) for
free names and tags, bv(￿) for bound variables/tag variables, and bn(￿) for bound
names/tags, respectively. As usual, we omit the trailing 0 of processes.
Pattern matching is included both in inputs and decryptions. In both cases, our
patterns are tuples of de￿nition terms (M1;￿￿￿;Mk) that have to be matched against
tuples of terms (E1;￿￿￿;Ek), when receiving (decrypting, resp.). Note that, at run
time, each tuple (E1;￿￿￿;Ek) only includes closed terms, i.e. each variable composing
each one of the Ei has been bound in the previous steps of the computation. Instead,
de￿nition terms Mi can be partitioned into closed terms to be matched and variables
to be bound. Intuitively, the matching succeeds when the closed terms, say Mi,
pairwise match to the corresponding terms Ei, and its e￿ect is to bind the remaining
terms Ej to the remaining variables \xj.
To exemplify, consider the following processes.
R = (￿]tid : ID2)(￿]tk : key)decrypt fID2;(A;agent);(NB;nonce);(z;key)gK as
f]tid;(A;agent);(NB;nonce);(\zk;]tk)g
lR
K in R0
~ R = (￿]tid : ID2)(￿]tk : key)decrypt fID0
3;(A;agent);(NB;nonce);(z;nonce)gK as
f]tid;(A;agent);(NB;nonce);(\zk;]tk)g
lR
K in ~ R0
S = decrypt ftid;(A;agent);(NB;nonce);(z;t)gK as
fID2;(A;agent);(NB;nonce);(\zk;key)g
lS
K in S0
The decryptions in R and ~ R always succeed and result in binding \zk to (the values
assumed by) z, ]tk to key and ]tid to ID2, in R, and ]tk to nonce and ]tid to ID0
3,
in ~ R. In particular, in ~ R the decryption succeeds, even though the declared tag for
]tk would be key and ]tid should be ID2. In the decryption in S \zk is bound to z
only if t is itself key and tid is ID2. Note that the principal that decrypts knows
which is the protocol he is running and also knows in which step has been generated
the encryption.
Operational Semantics
To simplify the de￿nition of our Control Flow Analysis in Section 3, we discipline
the ￿-renaming of bound values and variables. To do it in a simple and \implicit"
way, we partition all the names used by a process into ￿nitely many equivalence
classes and we use the names of the equivalence classes instead of the actual names.
This partition works in a way that names from the same equivalence class are
assigned a common canonical name and consequently there are only ￿nitely many
canonical names in any execution of a given process. This is enforced by assigning
the same canonical name to every name generated by the same restriction. The
canonical name bnc is for a name n; similarly bxc is for a variable x. In this way, we
statically maintain the identity of values and variables that may be lost by freely
applying ￿-conversions. Hereafter, when unambiguous, we shall simply write n
(resp. x) for bnc (resp. bxc). Similarly for tag variables.
5We give LySa a reduction semantics. We slightly modify the standard structural
congruence ￿ on LySa processes, to take care of tag declarations. We de￿ne ￿ as
the least congruence satisfying the following clauses:
￿ P ￿ Q if P and Q are disciplined ￿-equivalent (as explained above);
￿ (P=￿;j;0) is a commutative monoid;
￿ (￿n)0 ￿ 0, (￿n)(￿n0)P ￿ (￿n0)(￿n)P, (￿n)(P j Q) ￿ P j (￿n)Q if n 62 fn(P),
￿ (￿]t : Tag)0 ￿ 0, (￿]t : Tag)(￿]t0 : Tag)P ￿ (￿]t0 : Tag)(￿]t : Tag)P,
(￿]t : Tag)(P j Q) ￿ P j (￿]t : Tag)Q if ]t 62 bv(P);
￿ !P ￿ P j !P
The reduction relation !R is the least relation on closed processes that satis￿es
the rules in Table 1. We consider two variants of reduction relation !R, graphi-
cally identi￿ed by a di￿erent instantiation of the relation R, which decorates the
transition relation. Both semantics use the tag environment ￿, which maps a tag
variable to a tag.
￿ : XT ! Tag
One variant takes advantage of checks on tag associations, while the other one
discards them: essentially, the ￿rst semantics checks for tag matching, while the
other one does not (see below):
￿ the reference monitor semantics ￿ ‘ P !RM Q takes
R(E;M;￿) =
8
<
:
false if (M = ]t) ^ (E 6= ￿(]t))
true otherwise
This function only a￿ects tag variables, i.e. only de￿nition terms M in the form
]t. It checks whether the tag associated with the variable in the tag environment
(￿(]t)) is E .
￿ the standard semantics ￿ ‘ P ! Q takes, by construction, R to be universally
true (and therefore the index R is omitted).
Moreover, we de￿ne an auxiliary function that handles closed terms and variables to
be bound in two di￿erent ways. Technically, we implicitly partition the tuples and
treat the respective elements di￿erently. The pattern matching function comp(E;M)
compares E against M only when M is a closed term and not a de￿nition variable,
nor a de￿nition tag variable.
comp(E;M) =
8
<
:
false if M = 2 f\xj x 2 XSg [ f]tj t 2 XTg ^ (E 6= M)
true otherwise
We use the standard notion of substitution applied to a process P, P[E=M]. Note
that used in pattern matching, it only has an e￿ect on de￿nition variables \x and
de￿nition tags ]t; in the other cases the substitution function coincides with the
identity function.
The judgement ￿ ‘ P !R P0 means that the process P can evolve into P0, given
the tag environment ￿.
6(Com)
^k
i=1comp(Ei;Mi)
￿ ‘ hE1;:::;Eki:P j (M1;:::;Mk):Q!R P j Q[E1=M1;:::;Ek=Mk]
(Dec)
E0 = E0
0 ^ ^k
i=1comp(Ei;Mi) ^ ^k
i=1 R(Ei;Mi;￿)
￿ ‘ decrypt fE1;:::;EkgE0 as fM1;:::;Mkgl
E0
0 in P !R P[E1=M1;:::;Ek=Mk]
(Tag Decl) (Res)
￿[]t 7! Tag] ‘ P !R P0
￿ ‘ (￿ ]t : Tag)P !R (￿ ]t : Tag)P0
￿ ‘ P !R P0
￿ ‘ (￿ n)P !R (￿ n)P0
(Par) (Congr)
￿ ‘ P1 !R P0
1
￿ ‘ P1 j P2 !R P0
1 j P2
P ￿ P0 ^ ￿ ‘ P0 !R P00 ^ P00 ￿ P000
￿ ‘ P !R P000
Table 1
Operational semantics, ￿ ‘ P !R P 0, parameterised on R.
The rule (Com) expresses that an output hE1;:::;Eki:P is matched by an input
(M1;:::;Mk) by checking whether the closed terms Mi are pairwise the same with
the corresponding Ei (i.e. if comp(Ei;Mi)). When the matchings are successful,
the remaining Ej are bound to the corresponding Mj (that are use variables or tag
variables).
Similarly, the rule (Decr) expresses the result of matching an encryption
fE1;:::;EkgE0 against decrypt E asfM1;:::;Mkgl
E0
0 in P. As it was the case for
communication, the closed terms Mi must match the corresponding Ei, and ad-
ditionally the keys must be the same. Note that the key cannot be a de￿nition
variable: it has to be matched in order to decrypt. When the matching is success-
ful the remaining terms Ei are bound to the corresponding Mi (that are de￿nition
variables or de￿nition tag variables). Recall that in the reference monitor semantics
we ensure that the components of the decrypted message have the tags expected,
by checking whether tag variables, e.g., ]t, are bound to the tags included in the
corresponding tag environment, e.g., ￿(]t). In the standard semantics the condition
R(E;M;￿) is universally true and thus can be ignored.
Back to our example processes R; ~ R, and S, using the reference monitor seman-
tics, we have that in R, comp(ID2;]tid) = comp(z;\zk) = comp(key;]tk) = true
and R(key;]tk;￿) = true and R(ID2;]tid;￿) = true (because ￿(]tk) = key
and ￿(]tid) = ID2), while in ~ R, comp(z;\zk) = comp(nonce;]tk) = true, but
R(nonce;]tk;￿) = false (because nonce 6= ￿(]tk)) and also R(ID0
3;]tid;￿) = false
(because nonce 6= ￿(]tid)). Note also that in S, comp(t;key) = true only if t = key,
comp(tid;ID2) = true only if tid = ID2, and, in if both are true, then \zk is bound
to z.
The rule (Tag Decl) records the new association between the tag variable ]t
and the tag Tag in the tag environment ￿. The updating of ￿ is indicated as
7￿[]t 7! Tag]. The rules (Repl), (Par) and (Congr) are standard.
2.1 Dynamic Property
As for the dynamic property of processes, we call a process tag coherent, if the
process respects the declared tags and therefore is free of tag violations. This
amounts to saying that each computation possible in the standard semantics is also
possible in the reference monitor semantics. In turn, the reference monitor will
never stop any execution step, when in all computations, each tag variable is bound
to the expected tag, more precisely when each term has the expected type and the
decryption is performed on the encryption generated in the correct protocol and
in the correct step of the protocol. Actually, we assume that any attacker cannot
modify the contents of an encryption, unless possessing the encryption key. Thus,
we only consider tag violations arising inside encryptions and decryptions. As usual,
￿ stands for the transitive and re￿exive closure of the transition relation.
De￿nition 2.1 A process P is tag coherent if for all executions ￿ ‘ P !￿ P0 ! P00,
then ￿ ‘ P !￿
RM P0 !RM P00.
3 Static Analysis
We develop a Control Flow Analysis for tagged L YSA processes that safely over-
approximates all the possible protocol behaviour. The result of the analysis of a
process P also permits to safely approximate when the reference monitor may abort
the computation of P. The approximation is represented by a tuple (￿ ;￿;￿; ) (resp.
a pair (￿;#) when analysing a term E), called estimate for P (resp. for E), that
satis￿es the judgements de￿ned by the axioms and rules of Table 2. In particular, the
analysis records which value tuples may ￿ow over the network and which values may
be bound to each de￿nition variable (e.g. \x) and de￿nition tag variable (e.g. ]t).
Moreover, at each decryption place, the analysis checks whether a tag (e.g. nonce
or IDi) bound to each de￿nition tag variable is the intended one, or a violation is
reported. The analysis is de￿ned in the ￿avour of Flow Logic [ 25].
Analysis of Terms
The judgement for analysing terms is ￿ j= E : #. The analysis keeps track of the
potential values of variables x or tag variables t, by recording them into the global
abstract environment ￿ that maps variables and tag variable to the sets of values
that they may be bound to: ￿ : XS [ XT ! }(V al).
The judgement is de￿ned by the axioms and rules in the upper part of Table
2. The rules describe the analysis of terms which approximates the set of values #
that a term may evaluate to. A name n (a tag Tag, resp.) evaluates to the set #,
provided that n (Tag, resp.) belongs to #. Similarly for a variable x (a tag variable
t, resp.), provided that # includes the set of values ￿(x) (￿(t), resp.) to which x
(t, resp.) is associated with. To reduce the number of rules, we use the parameter
N that stands for both the generic name n and for the generic tag Tag, and the
parameter X that stands for both the generic variable x and for the generic tag
variable t.
8To produce the set #, the rule for (Encr) (i) ￿nds the sets #i for each term Ei,
(ii) collects all k-tuples of values (v0;￿￿￿;vk) taken from #0 ￿￿￿￿￿#k into values of
the form fv1;￿￿￿;vkgl
v0 (iii) requires these values to belong to #.
Analysis of Processes
In the analysis of processes, the information on the possible values, that may
￿ow over the network, is collected into the abstract network environment component
￿ ￿ }(V al￿) that includes all the value-tuples forming a message that may ￿ow on
the network.
The judgement for processes takes the form: ￿;￿;￿ j= P :  , where the compo-
nents ￿;￿, and ￿ are as above (recall that ￿ : XT ! Tag), while the component
  ￿ C, is the (possibly empty) set of \error messages" that take the form of decryp-
tion labels l: l 2   means that a tag-mismatching (or violation) may happen inside
the decryption labelled l.
The judgement is de￿ned by the axioms and rules in the lower part of Table 2
(where X ) Y means that Y is only evaluated when X is True) and are explained
later on.
For keeping the analysis component ￿nite, as said before, we have partitioned
all the names used by a process into ￿nitely many equivalence classes and we have
used the names of the equivalence classes instead of the actual names.
Before commenting on the analysis rules, we describe three auxiliary functions
that generate some logic formulas to be used in the analysis rules.
The ￿rst one is the matching function, that takes care of pattern matching,
by checking whether a value v corresponds to a term M. Remember that pattern
matching cannot be performed on either \x or ]t. If this is not the case, matching
succeeds when v is a possible evaluation of the term M.
match(v;M;￿) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
false if M 62 f\xj x 2 XSg [ f]tj t 2 XTg ^ (v 62 #)
where # is s.t. (￿ j= M : #)
true otherwise
For instance, when ￿ j= x : #, match(n;x;￿), is true if n 2 #, while is false if n 62 #;
match(m;\x;￿) is true, instead.
The second one is a substitution function, that takes care of variable binding.
Intuitively, it only makes sense to bind a value or a tag to either a de￿nition variable
or a de￿nition tag variable, respectively. So the substitution function binds the value
v to M only when M is a variable \x or a tag variable ]t.
sub(v;M;￿) =
8
<
:
false if (v 62 ￿(M)) with M 2 f\xj x 2 XSg [ f]tj t 2 XTg
true otherwise
For example, sub(m;\x;￿) is true if (m 2 ￿(x)), while sub(m;m;￿) is true.
The last function is about tag checking. Given a tag environment ￿, it checks
whether v is the expected tag of a de￿nition tag variable ]t. If it is not the case,
9the decryption labeled l, is recorded in the error component  . Note that in order
to let the tag checking work, M has to be a de￿nition tag.
chk(v;M;￿;l; ) =
8
<
:
false if M 2 f]tj t 2 XTg ^ (v 6= ￿(M)) ^ (l 2  )
true otherwise
For instance, if m 6= ￿(]t), then chk(m;]t;￿;l; ) is false and l 2  .
(Const)
N 2 #
￿ j= N : #
(N = Tag or n) (V ar)
￿(X) ￿ #
￿ j= X : #
(X = x or t)
(Encr)
^k
i=0 ￿ j= Ei : #i ^
8v0;:::;vk : ^k
i=0 vi 2 #i ) fv1;:::;vkgv0 2 #
￿ j= fE1;:::;EkgE0 : #
(Out)
^k
i=1 ￿ j= Ei : #i ^
8v1;:::;vk : ^k
i=1vi 2 #i ) hv1;:::;vki 2 ￿ ^
￿;￿;￿ j= P :  
￿;￿;￿ j= hE1;:::;Eki:P :  
(In)
8hv1;:::;vki 2 ￿ ^k
i=1 (match(vi;Mi;￿) ) sub(vi;Mi;￿) ^
￿;￿;￿ j= P :  )
￿;￿;￿ j= (M1;:::;Mk):P :  
(Dec)
￿ j= E : # ^ ￿ j= E0 : #0 ^
8fv1;:::;vkgv0 2 # : v0 2 #0 )
^k
i=1(match(vi;Mi;￿) ) (sub(vi;Mi;￿) ^ chk(vi;Mi;￿;l) ^
￿;￿;￿ j= P :  )
￿;￿;￿ j= decrypt E as fM1;:::;Mkgl
E0 in P :  
(TNew)
(]t;Tag) 2 ￿ ^ ￿;￿;￿ j= P :  
￿;￿;￿ j= (￿ ]t : Tag)P :  
(Par)
￿;￿;￿ j= P1 :   ^ ￿;￿;￿ j= P2 :  
￿;￿;￿ j= P1 j P2 :  
(Res)
￿;￿;￿ j= P :  
￿;￿;￿ j= (￿ n)P :  
(Rep)
￿;￿;￿ j= P :  
￿;￿;￿ j=!P :  
(Nil) ￿;￿;￿ j= 0 :  
Table 2
Analysis of tagged Lysa Terms: ￿ j= E : #, and Processes: ￿;￿; ￿ j= P :  
We now brie￿y comment on the rules for analysing processes. In the premises
of the rule for k-ary output (Out), we require that all the terms are abstractly
evaluated, and that all the combinations of these values are recorded in ￿. Indeed
these are the values that may be communicated. Finally, the continuation process
must be analysed.
The rule (In) describes the analysis of pattern matching input and uses both
the match and substitution functions. The idea is to examine all the sequences of
10hv1;:::;vki in the ￿ component and to pointwise compare them against the tuple of
de￿nition terms (M1;:::;Mk). The matching function selects only the closed terms
(names or tags) and for each of them, say Mi, checks whether the corresponding vi is
included in #i, i.e. the result of the analysis for Mi. If the matching succeeds for all
the closed terms, then, the substitution function takes care of binding the remaining
values vj to the corresponding de￿nition variables or de￿nition tag variables Mj.
Moreover, the continuation process must be analysed.
The rule for decryption (Dec) is quite similar to the rule for input: matching
and substitution are handled in the same way. The values to be matched are those
obtained by evaluating the term E and the de￿nition ones are the terms inside the
decryption. If the matching succeeds for all closed terms, then the substitution
is applied to the remaining values that are bound to the corresponding de￿nition
variables or de￿nition tag variables. When processing the substitution, tag checking
is also performed to capture possible violations. These occur when a de￿nition tag
variable is bound to an unexpected tag. In this case, the label l of the decryption
is recorded in the error component  . In the case of both input and decryption the
continuation process P is analysed only when the input or decryption could indeed
succeed.
The rule for tag declaration (TNew) requires that the declared tag is recorded in
the tag environment ￿. The rule for the inactive process (Nil) does not restrict the
analysis result, while the rules for parallel composition (Par), restriction (Res), and
replication (Rep) ensure that the analysis also holds for the immediate subprocesses.
Semantic properties
Our analysis is semantically correct regardless of the way the semantics of LySa is
parameterised. More precisely, we proved a subject reduction theorem for both the
standard and the reference monitor semantics: ( ￿;￿; ;￿) for P is a valid estimate
also for all the states passed through in a computation of P, i.e. for all the derivatives
of P.
Theorem 3.1 (Subject reduction) If ￿ ‘ P ! Q and ￿;￿;￿ j= P :   then
￿;￿;￿ j= Q :  . Furthermore, if   = ; then P !RM Q
In addition, when analysing a process P if the error component   is empty then
the reference monitor cannot stop the execution of P. This means that our analysis
correctly predicts when we can safely do without the reference monitor. We shall
say that the reference monitor RM cannot abort a process P whenever there exist
no Q, Q0 such that P !￿ Q ! Q0 and P !￿
RM Q = !RM, where Q = !RM stands for
:9Q0 : Q !RM Q0. We then have:
Theorem 3.2 (Static check for reference monitor) If ￿;￿;￿ j= P :   and
  = ; then RM cannot abort P.
Example As shown in [4], our analysis acts in a descriptive way: it describes which
violations may occur. In the same setting, our approach also o￿ers a prescriptive
usage: we can impose a tag discipline, by forcing some data to correspond to the
expected tags. At this point, the analysis may statically check that tag violations
are not possible any longer. In other words, we can instrument the code with the
11only checks necessary to enforce tag security. We can illustrate it on our example
processes R; ~ R, and S. For detecting possible tag violations, in ~ R, we assume that
the tk should be key, but we do not impose it in the protocol speci￿cation, we do not
check the tag associated with the received value. The analysis, instead, correctly
reveals that the tag received, may be nonce. For preventing such a tag violation
and the consequent attack from arising, the protocol has to be modelled di￿erently,
by explicitly requiring that tk has to be a key. More precisely, we check whether
the tag associated with the value received and decrypted is key as expected. As a
consequence, the decryption fails and the analysis result does not ￿nd potential tag
violations any longer.
Modelling the Attacker
In a protocol execution, several principals exchange messages over an open net-
work, which is accessible to the attackers and therefore vulnerable to malicious
behaviour. We assume an active Dolev-Yao attacker [ 11]: it can eavesdrop, and re-
play, encrypt, decrypt, generate messages providing that the necessary information
is within his knowledge, that it increases while interacting with the network.
This scenario can be modelled in L YSA as a process running in parallel with
the protocol process. Formally, we shall have Psys j P￿, where Psys represents
the protocol process and P￿ is some arbitrary attacker. The attacker acquires its
knowledge by interacting with Psys, starting from the public knowledge (secret
messages and keys are not accessible to the attacker). Instead of considering only
one attacker, we want to consider how P behaves under the attack of arbitrary
attackers P￿. To get an account of the in￿nitely many attackers, the overall idea
is to ￿nd a formula (for a similar treatment see [ 6]) that characterizes all P￿: this
means that whenever an estimate (￿;￿;￿; ) satis￿es it, then (￿;￿;￿) j= P￿ :  
for all attackers P￿. The estimates we consider hereafter will satisfy the formula.
Intuitively, the formula has to mimic how all the P￿ are analysed. The attacker
process is parameterised on some attributes of Psys, e.g. the length of all the
encryptions occurred and all the messages sent over then network. In the formula,
the names and variables the attacker uses are apart from the ones used by Psys. We
can then postulate a new distinguished name n￿ and a new distinguished variable
z￿, in which the names and variables, resp., of the attacker are coalesced; therefore
n￿ may represent any name generated by the attacker, while ￿(z￿) represents the
attacker knowledge. Due to space limitations, we shall not go further into details
here. For a similar setup we refer the interested reader to [ 6].
Implementation and Complexity
The overall goal of the implementation of the analysis is to compute the analysis
result (￿, ￿, etc.) for a given process. This is done in two phases. In the ￿rst phase,
construct a function using Standard ML that translates a L YSA process into a logic
formula in Alternation-free Least Fixed Point logic [ 24], which is regarded as an
extension of Horn clauses, and in the second phase use Succinct Solver to compute
interpretations of predicates that satisfy the formula. As the Succinct Solver is used
to compute a ￿nite representation of the analysis result, according to the Proposition
2 in [24], it is easy to draw a conclusion that: a ￿nite representation of an analysis
12result for ￿;￿;￿ j= P :   may be computed in low polynomial time in the size of
the process P.
4 Multi-protocol tagging
We are able to statically detected a family of similar attacks in a setting where the
(secure in isolation) Bauer-Berson-Feiertag (BBF) [ 3] and Woo-Lam Authentication
￿f (WL) [29] protocols are running in parallel, using the same long-term keys (they
both use symmetric encryption). They are all based on the fact that the initiator
of the WL can be exploited as an oracle to produce an encryption that can be
confused with the encryption including the new session key in the BBF protocol,
thus attacking the secrecy and authentication of BBF. For lack of space, we only
show one of these attacks. In this setting, each principal can participate in di￿erent
protocols and the trusted server S serves in both protocols. In BBF, S is used
to generate and distribute a new session key, while in WL S acts as intermediary
between I and R.
In BBF, the initiator, I, sends its identi￿er and a new fresh nonce to R which
forwards them to the trusted server, together with its own identi￿er and nonce. The
server creates the new session key and replays back to R two encrypted messages;
R decrypts the one encrypted with the long-term key, KRS, veri￿es that the nonce
is the same generated earlier in the session, and forwards the other encryption to
I, that can decrypt it and check for the nonce. At the end, both should obtain the
new session key.
The initiator I of the WL protocol sends R its identi￿er and receives back from
him its nonce. Then I sends to R its nonce and both the principal identi￿ers,
encrypted with its long-term key KRS. The responder contacts the server S by
sending him an encryption containing the I’s message together with its nonce and
the principal identi￿ers. Eventually, S con￿rms the identity of I to R by sending
R an encryption containing the fresh nonce generated in the second step of WL.
The narration of the two protocols follows.
1: I ! R : I;NI
2: R ! S : I;NI;R;NR
3: S ! R : fKIR;I;NRgKRS;fKIR;NI;RgKIS
4: R ! I : fKIR;NI;RgKIS
1: I ! R : I
2: R ! I : NR
3: I ! R : fI;R;NRgKIS
4: R ! S : fI;R;NR;fI;R;NRgKISgKRS
5: S ! R : fI;R;NRgKIS
BBF WL
In Table 3 we show the speci￿cation of the two protocols, where each message
begins with the pair of roles involved in the exchange. For the sake of simplicity, we
only specify the single roles in each protocol. Actually, each agent can participate
in both protocols and can play in both the initiator and responder roles.
The attack arises in a scenario where the principal B begins a run of WL as initiator
with A as a responder. His messages are intercepted by the attacker ( M(X) stands
for the attacker impersonating the principal X). The principal B is then involved as
responder in a run of the protocol BBF, apparently with A as initiator, but actually
with M(AI). The attacker exploits the fact that the long-term key KBS between
13=￿Role I in BBF ￿= (￿ NI)(￿ ]txk1 : KEY )(￿ ]txp : BBF3)
=￿1￿= hI;R;I;NIi:
=￿4￿= (R;I;\ xe1):decrypt xe1 as
f]txp; (]txk1;\xk1);(nonce;NI);(agent;R)g
‘1
KIS in 0
=￿Role I in WL￿=
=￿1￿= hI;R;Ii:
=￿2￿= (R;I;\xn):
=￿3￿= hI;RfWL3;(agent;I);(agent;R);(nonce;xn)gKISi:0
=￿Role R in BBF ￿= (￿ NR)(￿ ]typ : WL2)(￿ ]tyk : KEY )
=￿1￿= (I;R;\y1;\y2):
=￿2￿= hR;S;y1;y2;R;NRi:
=￿3￿= (S;R;\ye1;\ye2):decrypt ye1 asf]typ;(]tyk;\yk);(agent;y1);(nonce;NR)g
‘2
KRS in
=￿4￿= hR;I;ye2i:0
=￿Role R in WL￿= (￿ N0
I)(￿ ]typ1 : WL5)(￿ ]tya2 : AGENT)
=￿1￿= (I;R;\ya1):
=￿2￿= hR;I;N0
Ri:
=￿3￿= (I;R;\ye3):
=￿4￿= hR;S; f(agent;ya1);(agent;R);(nonce;N 0
R);ye3gKRSi:
=￿5￿= (S;R;\ye4):decrypt ye4 as
f]typ1;(agent;ya1);(agent;R);(nonce;N 0
R)g
‘3
KBS in 0
=￿Server in BBF ￿= (￿ K1)
=￿2￿= (R;S;I;\sn1;R;\sn2):
=￿3￿= hS;R; fBBF3;(key;K1);(agent;I);(nonce;sn2gKRS;
fBBF3;(key;K1);(nonce;sn1);(agent;R)gKISi:0
=￿Server in WL￿= (￿ ]tzp1 : WL4)(￿ ]tzp2 : WL3)(￿ ]tzn1 : NONCE)
=￿4￿= (R;S;\ze1):decrypt ze1 as
f]tzp1;(agent;I);(agent;R);(]tzn1;\zn1);\ ze2g
‘4
KRS in
decrypt ze2 inf]tzp2;(agent;I);(agent;R);(tzn1;zn)g
‘5
KIS in
=￿5￿= hS;R; fWL5;(agent;I);(agent;R);(nonce;zn1)gKRSi:0
Table 3
Speci￿cation of the two protocols
B and S is the same in both the protocols. More precisely, the intruder suitably
mixes the nonces of the two protocols and then exploits B, in the role of initiator in
WL, as an oracle to get a message composed with three terms and encrypted with
KBS (fB;A;NBgKBS), that can be wrongly accepted by B, in the role of responder
in BBF, as the encryption containing the new session key, the name of the initiator
and the nonce generated in the second step of BBF. As a consequence B, in the
BBF session, believes to have communicated with A and that the new session key
is B.
= ￿ 1:WL ￿ = B ! M(A) : B
= ￿ 1:BBF ￿ = M(A) ! B : A;NA
= ￿ 2:BBF ￿ = B ! M(S) : A;NA;B;NB
= ￿ 2:WL ￿ = M(A) ! B : NB
= ￿ 3:WL ￿ = B ! M(A) : fB;A;NBgKBS = ￿ B acts as an oracle for the intruder ￿ =
= ￿ 3:BBF ￿ = M(S) ! B : fB;A;NBgKBS;fB;A;NBgKBS = ￿ B accepts a wrong key ￿ =
= ￿ 4:BBF ￿ = B ! M(A) : fB;A;NBgKBS
In the LYSA speci￿cation, a system su￿cient to capture the above attack, is de￿ned
14as the parallel composition of three processes A, B, and S, running in parallel within
the scope of the shared keys: System = (￿KAS)(￿KBS)AkBkS, where A and B
can play as initiator and responder in both protocols, and the actions in the two
roles in the two protocols run in parallel. In particular, we can focus on B in the
role of initiator in WL and B in the role of responder in BBF.
Our analysis correctly detects the message confusion that occurs at step 3 of
the BBF protocol. In facts, the results, limited to the variables of interest, listed
below, shows that there has been a tag violation ( l2 2  ) in the encryption, where an
agent identi￿er, B has been accepted as a key (fnonceg 2 ￿(tyk), but ￿(tyk) = key).
Furthermore, from fWL3g 2 ￿(typ) and ￿(typ) = BBF3 we can say that a message
created in WL at step 3 has been instead accepted in BBF at step 3.
ffBBF3;(key;K1);(agent;A);(nonce;NB)gKBS;
fWL3;(agent;B);(agent;A);(nonce;NB)gKBSg 2 ￿(ye1)
fBBF3;WL3g 2 ￿(typ) fkey;nonceg 2 ￿(tyk) fK1;Bg 2 ￿(tyk) fl2g 2  
Note that the above results can be obtained by the speci￿cation in Table 3, by
replacing I and R in the third step of BBF with A and B, resp.
Furthermore, if we replaced typ with BBF3, i.e. if we forced the decrypted value
to match the tag BBF3, as in
decrypt ye1 as fBBF3;(]tyk;\yk);(agent;y1);(nonce;NB)g
‘2
KBS in :::
then the attack could be prevented at run time. The analysis of the new speci￿cation
would be indeed such that   = ;. Intuitively, in the third step of BBF, B could still
receive fB;A;NBgKBS, but the decryption would fail, because of pattern matching,
in fact comp(BBF3;WL3) = false. This is an example of instrumentation of the
code, used to introduce the only necessary checks on tags.
5 Conclusion
In the multi-protocol setting, harmful interactions among di￿erent protocols often
are based on the presence of similar patterns in messages that can be exploited by
attackers. As an example, we modelled and analysed a new and undocumented
family of attacks that occur when the Bauer-Berson-Feiertag and the Woo-Lam
authentication protocols are concurrently executed. We can also statically detect
some of the attacks reported in [9], that we do not present here for lack of space
(an example can be found in [5]).
We extended the process calculus L YSA with tags, which represent the intended
types of terms, and the intended protocol and message step. The semantics uses a
reference monitor to capture tag-mismatching at run time. We developed a Control
Flow Analysis to check at each decryption place whether the received, secret data
has the right type and the message has been generated in the same protocol, in
the correct step. Our tagging schema let us therefore detect possible multi-protocol
attacks. In addition, we can impose a prescriptive tag discipline, by using tags at
run time to semantically force some data { only the ones that can be confused { to
be accepted only if they correspond to the expected ones: in this case, we aim at
15preventing tag violation to arise. Attaching type tags and protocol identi￿ers within
encrypted messages is a classical countermeasure to prevent this kind of attacks.
It is often unnecessary and redundant to do it in every message. The suggestions
given by the analysis on how to instrument the code with the necessary checks can
thus lead to useful insights on the optimal usage of tags at run time, identifying the
necessary ones.
In the last years, LYSA has been given di￿erent kinds of annotations for checking
some classic security properties, e.g. con￿dentiality [ 13], freshness [12] and message
authentication [6]. It is very easy to combine tags with the above annotations, thus
obtaining a more general form of analysis. We therefore obtain a unique and unifying
framework for studying protocols. Our analysis has been implemented and can be
computed in low polynomial time in the size of the process under consideration.
Studies on multi-protocol systems are usually focused on analysing possible in-
teractions between two, or a few more, speci￿c protocols running in parallel, as in
[9]. There, veri￿cation techniques exploiting the Scyther Tool [ 8] are presented, in
order to check the security properties of little groups of protocols, and to discover
new multi-protocol attacks. Scyther can work to compute a ￿xed number of runs or
to simulate an unbounded number of runs. When the tool veri￿es a limited number
of runs, then it is proved to terminate, otherwise termination is not guaranteed. Our
analysis always terminates and it can also be used to deal with unbounded sessions.
We have termination, because ours is a static analysis: the price is a loss in preci-
sion, that with a dynamic technique there is not. Model checking has been instead
used in [26] to discover new attacks. This technique has the disadvantage of the
state-explosion, that still, due to its approximation, Control Flow Analysis does not
o￿er. Also [21], presents a certain number of new multi-protocol attacks. Similarly
to [20], we apply a uniform tagging scheme for all the protocols in the system. We
remark that our tags just identify the expected types of message components and
protocol identi￿ers, instead of roles, identity, authentication, veri￿cation , as in [20].
There is also a line of research devoted to establishing conditions for composition of
protocols. In [14], authors de￿ne two protocols independent, when the achievement
of a security goal of one protocol does not depend on the execution of the other.
Using the Strand Space formalism [15], they prove that protocol independence is
obtainable if encryption is used in non-overlapping way.
The Control Flow Analysis presented here is based on a particular kind of tags.
There are a lot of di￿erent tagging schemes in literature that can be included in our
framework as well, e.g. the just referred [ 20] or the ones proposed in [9].
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